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Traditionally, the compliance rates with preventive care services for members in 
the Medicaid Program are significantly lower than their peers enrolled in a commercial 
health insurance plan even when there are no financial costs for those services to 
Medicaid members. Start of life services which include prenatal care for pregnant 
mothers and well-child visits for newborns and infants are used to focus the research. 
Non-compliance, defined as not receiving recommended preventive services 
within the timeframe expected, has large financial and societal costs. Women who 
receive only the minimal prenatal care are at high risk for developing pregnancy 
complications and having negative birth outcomes while those that failed to receive 
prenatal care were three times more likely to have a low-birth weight infant. Within the 
first 6 months of life, children with incomplete visits are 60 percent more likely to visit 
the emergency room. They may have untreated development delays and disabilities, 
vi 
 
which occur in approximately 13 percent of children and are estimated to cost $417,000 
in direct medical costs and indirect lost productivity per child. 
This thesis looks at motivational theories and economic incentives in practice in 
the health care industry to address the lack of compliance of services. It will analyze the 
problem from the perspective of how does a business, the State Medicaid Program or 
Medicaid Managed Care Organization (MCO), get a customer, the Medicaid population, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF MEDICAID 
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Social Security Amendments of 1965, 
which added Title XIX to the Social Security Act and created the Medicaid program to 
provide health care benefits for people and families with low incomes, limited resources, 
and special needs. The Medicaid program is a State-administered, Federally-governed 
program funded by both levels determined by the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentages (FMAP) formula (Department of Health & Human Services, 2010). The 
states can utilize a waiver authority to move membership to privatized Managed Care 
Organizations (MCO), generally traditional Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) 
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).  
PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS IN MEDICAID AS A POPULATION 
One special population in Medicaid is the pregnant women and infants at or 
below the poverty line. This is now a required population for States that participate in the 
Medicaid program. The health coverage includes all pregnancy-relates services from 
prenatal, delivery, and post-partum services and well-child visits for children, also known 
as Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (ESPDT) visits. Once 
eligibility is established for a pregnant woman, the coverage is effective until 60 days 
after the end of the pregnancy, and infants born to those mothers are covered as 
“newborns” until their first birthday (Pregnant Women). 
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MEDICAID COSTS OF THE POPULATION 
Pregnant women and newborns are protected from the general alternative 
premiums that might be required for other coverage and services under the Premiums and 
Cost Sharing rules (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2008) and incur no cost 
for care associated with basic prenatal care and delivery and other pregnancy-related 
services to improve maternal and infant health outcomes (Ranji, M.S., Salganicoff, Ph.D., 
Stewart, J.D., Cox, M.A., M.P.H., & Doamekpor, 2009). Total Medicaid spending in 
FY2009 was 380.6 Billion with an average cost per enrollee of $6,890 while non-
disabled children received an estimated $2,848 in benefits on average (Department of 
Health & Human Services, 2010). Of the 4.2 million deliveries in 2008, 94.1 percent had 
complications incurring a 50 percent increase in delivery costs over deliveries without 
complications with a total cost of $17.4 billion in 2008, or nearly 5 percent of total 
hospital costs in the United States (Elixhauser, Phd & Wier, MPH, 2011). 
COMPLIANCE WITH AND BENEFITS OF PREVENTIVE SERVICES 
Prenatal care refers to regular medical care recommend for women during 
pregnancy consisting of a visit once a month for weeks 4 through 28, twice a month for 
weeks 28 through 36, and weekly for week 36 to birth (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services). Women who receive only the minimal prenatal care are at high risk for 
developing pregnancy complications and having negative birth outcomes while those that 
failed to receive prenatal care were three times more likely to have a low-birth weight 
(National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), 2011). In 2010, 91.0 percent of 
Commercial HMO pregnant women had 80 percent or more of expected prenatal visits 
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while only 83.7 percent of Medicaid pregnant women had 80 percent or more of expected 
prenatal visits (National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), 2011). 
After birth, infants receive well-child visits frequently within the first 15 months 
of life, with 6 or more visits expected, that provide a complete physical and 
developmental examination of the child along with vaccinations (Jennifer K. Mannheim, 
2011). Within the first 6 months of life, children with incomplete visits are 60 percent 
more likely to visit the emergency room. They may have untreated development delays 
and disabilities, which occur in approximately 13 percent of children and are estimated to 
cost $417,000 in direct medical costs and indirect lost productivity per child (National 
Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), 2011). In 2010, 76.3 percent of Commercial 
HMO children fewer than 15 months of age received 6 or more well-child visits while 
only 60.2 percent of Medicaid children, which has been trending upwards from 37.3 
percent of Medicaid children in 2001 (National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA), 2011). 
Non-compliance with preventive services is defined as not receiving the 
recommended health care services or number of visits for preventive care.  
THESIS AND STRUCTURE 
Given that preventive services are free of costs for pregnant mothers and 
children in Medicaid, why are the compliance rates for these services significantly 
lower for this population than for those covered under commercial insurance?  
This problem will be approached from multiple angles starting with identifying 
some of the root causes and problems. It will be analyzed from the perspective of how 
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does a business, the State Medicaid Program or Medicaid Managed Care Organization 
(MCO), get a customer, the Medicaid population, to perform a specific behavior, receive 
preventive care services using motivational theories. It will examine the motivations of 
all the stakeholders in the care chain: insurers, providers, and members.  
It is an important question from a financially sustainable position of a state or 
Managed Care Organization because the hospital costs for an infant with a principal 
diagnosis of low birth weight or prematurity was $75,000 compared to $1,300 for infants 
without complications (O’Connor, Healthy Babies: Efforts to Improve Birth Outcomes 
and Reduce High Risk Births, 2004). Infant care in neonatal intensive care units (NIQUs) 
accounts for 75 percent of all newborn care costs and have an average cost of about 
$3,000 per day (Kornhauser, MD & Schneiderman, MD, 2010). Out of the 21 reporting 
states, over 45 percent, on average, of all births were in the Medicaid program in 2009 
(Marks, 2010 Maternal and Child Health Update, 2011).  
It is an important question from an academic perspective of why people do not 
take advantage of a service that is in their best interest and has no cost, and how do you 
motivate them to receive the service. Most of the focus by insurers and State programs 
has been on economic incentives and penalties directed at the Managed Care 
Organizations and health care providers. Recently, there have been studies performed on 




This thesis will be presented in five chapters.  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 provides the background and history of the Medicaid Program, how it 
works, and identifies the specific subset of Medicaid population being researched. It 
continues to describe the phenomenon being researched and why it is important to us as a 
society.  
 
Chapter 2: Background on Health Care and Compliance 
Chapter 2 introduces the constituents of a Medicaid program and reviews rate 
trends for relevant measures from the HEDIS standards for statistical analysis of 
compliance. It identifies through studies common barriers to receiving care for the 
Medicaid population.  
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review  
Chapter 3 includes a review of available data sources related to motivation and 
economic incentive theories. Motivation has been studied since Sigmund Freud founded 
Psychoanalysis, and it has been further explored and refined since that time. There is a 
wealth of studies, many recent that discuss intrinsic and extrinsic motivation theories – 




Chapter 4: Analysis and Recommendations 
Chapter 4 applies the motivational theories to the responsible parties in the health 
care delivery system. It will discuss current interventions and applications to improve 
care through extrinsic motivation.  
 
Chapter 5: Conclusions. 
This paper will interlace these approaches together to draw conclusions about 






Chapter 2: Background on Health Care and Compliance 
MEDICAID INSURANCE STRUCTURE 
In Medicaid, there are three parties involved in the care delivery system: the 
insurer, the health care provider, and the individual patients (members of the insurer). 
The insurer can be the State managed Medicaid Program (e.g. a fee-for-service program) 
or a Managed Care Organization. The provider can be an individual physician, a legally 
organized group of physicians, and a facility like a hospital. The member is a Medicaid 
eligible individual assigned to the insurer to provide health insurance. The insurer 
contracts with the providers to create a network of providers and services to support their 
membership.  
When the Medicaid program is outsourced to private insurers, members have a 
choice of insurer during open enrollment period. Otherwise, the member is assigned to 
the State with no choice. This assignment decides the available providers based on the 
insurer’s provider network. Private insurers are required by contract to maintain a 
specific number of providers of each type to prevent access to care.  
MEDICAL STATISTICAL DATA 
Health care is a well-studied subject in the United States supported by claim data 
available from insurers. The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) 
provides technical specifications, the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
(HEDIS), used by more than 90 percent of America’s health plans (National Committee 
for Quality Assurance) to measure compliance. It contains measures for preventive care 
for prenatal and postpartum visits for pregnant women and well-child visits for newborns. 
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Specifically, the related measures within the HEDIS specifications are: “Prenatal and 
Postpartum Care”, “Frequency of Ongoing Prenatal Care”, and “Well-Child Visits in the 
First 15 Months of Life”.  
COMPLIANCE RATES 
The NCQA HEDIS standard for reporting and the annual report is used for all the 
following tables for measuring compliance among the population in receiving the 
expected services. The following measures and definitions of the measures are taken 
directly from the annual report NCQA “The State of Health Care Quality 2011” report 
(National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), 2011). The measures identified are 
strictly related to prenatal care and well-child visits. HEDIS consists of 76 measures 
across 5 domains of care.  
 All Medicaid rates are trending upwards, but all still remain significantly behind 
their commercial counterparts. Only about 60 percent of Medicaid mothers receive 80 
percent or more of the recommend prenatal visits – there is not a commercial set of 
values to compare against. Only about 60 percent of Medicaid children ages 0-15 months 





Prenatal and Postpartum Care 
This measure has two indicators related to deliveries of live births between 
November 6 of the year prior to the measurement year and November 5 of the 
measurement year. Timeliness of Prenatal Care: The percentage of deliveries that 
received a prenatal care visit in the first trimester or within 42 days of enrollment 






2010 91.0 83.7 
2009 93.1 83.4 
2008 92.4 81.9 
2007 91.9 81.5 
2006 90.6 81.2 
2005 91.8 79.6 
2004 90.8 78.2 
2003 89.4 76.5 
2002 86.7 70.4 
2001 85.1 72.9 
Table 1: Timeliness of Prenatal Care 
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Frequency of Ongoing Prenatal Care Measure 
This utilization measure assesses the percentage of Medicaid deliveries between 
November 6 of the year prior to the measurement year and November 5 of the 
measure year that received the following number of expected prenatal visits: <21 
percent of expected visits; 21 percent–40 percent of expected visits; 41 percent–
60 percent of expected visits; 61 percent–80 percent of expected visits; [and] ≥81 


















Well-Child Visits in the First 15 Months of Life 
 
The percentage of children who turned 15 months old during the measurement 
year and had the following number of well-child visits with a primary care 
physician during the first 15 months of life: No well-child visits; One well-child 
visit; Two well child visits; Three well-child visits; Four well-child visits; Five 






2010 76.3 60.2 
2009 74.5 59.4 
2008 75.2 58.8 
2007 72.8 52.9 
2006 72.9 55.6 
2005 71.1 49.1 
2004 68.7 47.4 
2003 66.6 45.2 
2002 64.4 43.0 
2001 59.6 37.3 




MEASURES OF QUALITY 
The HEDIS measures capture numerically a quantified and measurable number 
regarding the quality of care based on expected services, but receiving a service is only 
loosely linked to the actual outcome of care. Other measures from the findings of the Pay 
for Performance Program Summary prepared for California HealthCare Foundation 
include (Bailit Health Purchasing, LLC, 2009):  
 Access: measure of easy access to services.  
 Process: measure of compliance with the standard of service (e.g. did the 
member receive the appropriate number of prenatal visits).  
 Outcome: measure of the outcome of care. 
 Structure: measure of capability and infrastructure (e.g. electronic medical 
records or e-prescribing). 
 Efficiency: measure of operational efficiency.  
 Quality Improvement Programs: measure of participating or starting a 
quality improvement program.  
BARRIERS TO CARE 
Finding relevant and timely information about barriers to care for prenatal and 
well-child visits specific to the Medicaid population (excluding the uninsured) has been 
more challenging. State-specific studies will be used and limitations of application to 
other states will be recognized as stipulations. This is an area that could be further 
addressed through surveys delivered after maternal hospital admissions and captured 
during emergency room visits for infants.  
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In 2007, Texas was court-ordered to conduct an independent study to identify 
barriers to utilization of EPSDT services for children in the Medicaid managed care 
programs called the “Frew No Care Study” (Altarum Institute, 2010). The study used 3 
methods to collect and analyze data regarding barriers to access and care: administrative 
(claim) data, surveys, and focus groups.  
The Texas “Frew No Care Study” provided a detailed analysis of barriers to well-
child care for the State of Texas. The authors felt that, “[t]he prevalence of No Care in 
Texas compares favorably to the prevalence of No Care derived from the nationally 
representative 2007 Medical Expenditure Panel Study.” (Altarum Institute, 2010) 
Altarum chose the 2007 as reasonably recent study as a reference point (Altarum 
Institute, 2010). 
 
In order to provide a point of reference against which to compare the observed 
rate of No Care among Class Members, Altarum conducted an analysis of data 
from the 2007 Medical Expenditure Panel Study (MEPS). Funded by the Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality, MEPS is designed to provide data on 
healthcare use, medical expenditures, sources of payment, and insurance coverage 
for a representative sample of the noninstitutionalized U.S. population.  
 
The study identified lack of physical access, communication barriers, and 
awareness of services as the most important barriers to well-child visits (Altarum 
Institute, 2010). In addition, the report noted a strong inverse relationship between length 
of enrollment in the Medicaid program and the likelihood of being in the No Care group 
in the study (Altarum Institute, 2010).   
For prenatal visits, other studies found similarities with the Frew report on 
barriers. A study by the National Public Health and Hospital Institute found that barriers 
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to care included: lack of transportation and provider networks to ensure adequate access, 
language and cultural barriers, and knowledge regarding the importance of prenatal care ( 
(Regenstein, PhD, Cummings, PhD, & Huang, MS, 2005). These barriers align with the 
lack of physical access, communication, and awareness of service barriers identified in 
the Frew report.  
Lack of Physical Access 
The Frew study identified transportation issues as one of the most frequently 
identified barriers even referencing a Texas Medicaid Transportation Program (MTP) 
which showed that over 1,000,000 Medicaid-enrolled do not have access to transportation 
services (Altarum Institute, 2010). This was identified as significant to rural areas but 
also relevant to urban areas without comprehensive public transportation networks.  
Access to care issues included the inability to find providers willing to accept new 
Medicaid patients as part of their panels. Parents that had primary care providers often 
faced other barriers with provider office logistics, including: the ability to schedule 
appointments, inconvenient clinic hours, long waiting room lines, and doctors that appear 
unresponsive to their needs (Altarum Institute, 2010). 
Communication Barriers 
The study referenced a Health Services Research report that found non-English 
speakers were in poorer health and had more difficulty in accessing care (Altarum 
Institute, 2010). Often interpreters or interpreter services were not available in 
physicians’ offices or clinics, and family members acting as interpreters were found to 
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make “clinically significant errors” compared to professionally trained interpreters 
(Altarum Institute, 2010).  
Awareness of Services 
"Health Literacy: The degree to which individuals have the capacity to obtain, 
process, and understand basic health information and services needed to make 
appropriate health decisions." (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
2010) 
 
Navigating the health care system can be confusing and difficult even for those 
that work in the industry itself. Given that outsiders to the industry, and more specifically 
the Medicaid population, generally have a lower level of health literacy, knowledge of 
benefits available and how to access them is a significant barrier to receiving appropriate 
and timely care (Altarum Institute, 2010). The study drew from a number of supporting 
reports of the impact of lower health literacy.  
 
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report (2001) indicated that parents 
of children eligible for EPSDT services are less likely than other parents to be 
aware of the necessity for preventive care or well-child visits. Riportella-Muller 
(1996) found that a number of parents do not think that care is necessary when a 
child is not sick, and some parents claim that their child received an EPSDT 
preventive care visit while a review of their Medicaid claims and encounters 
failed to substantiate such a preventive care visit. A recent evaluation of an 
outreach and education program in California indicated that increasing knowledge 
of the program was effective in increasing the rate of utilization of EPSDT 





Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Motivation has been studied since Sigmund Freud founded Psychoanalysis. This 
chapter will look at both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation theories that have been 
developed and studied since Freud. It will look at a traditional view of motivational 
theory and a contemporary view of motivational theory. It will provide a short 
comparison of the two different views to highlight the challenges in the traditional view. 
MOTIVATIONAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVE THEORIES 
Motivation describes the psychological forces that determine what a person will 
do (direction), how hard they will try (effort), and how hard they will try in the face of 
obstacles (persistence). It is further refined into intrinsic motivation (internally driven) 
and extrinsic motivation (externally driven). Intrinsic motivation is the drive to do or 
accomplish something because of the enjoyment or sense of satisfaction that it brings. 
Extrinsic motivation is the drive to do or accomplish something because there is an 
external reward received from that action.  
EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION  
While intrinsic is motivation from internal factors, extrinsic is motivation through 
external factors in the form of rewards or penalties. Often these rewards and penalties 
come through remunerative and financial economic incentives (e.g. pay and performance-
related bonuses). To be successful, the reward must be something the person values 
(valence), feels that the behavior can be exhibited or task can be completed 
(instrumentality), and believes they themselves have the capability to accomplish what is 
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requested satisfactory to obtain the reward (expectancy).  Victor Vroom first introduced 
this model of motivation as the Expectancy Theory in his 1964 book Work and 
Motivation (Vroom, 1964).  
Newer research is discovering that financial incentives can have unintended 
negative consequences. Adam Grant and Jitendra Singh identified three risks with strong 
financial incentives in place in their paper “The Problem with Financial Incentives” 
(Grant & Singh, 2011). The first risk is that many recipients of the program will cross 
ethical boundaries to earn the reward – often choosing the easiest path versus the right 
path. Second, financial incentives can create pay inequity amongst peers, which can harm 
performance. Third, social psychological research has shown that extrinsic rewards can 
lead to reducing intrinsic motivation. “This is known as the overjustification effect: Our 
intrinsic interest in a task can be overshadowed by a strong incentive, which convinces us 
that we are working for the incentive.”  
A TRADITIONAL VIEW OF INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
Abraham Maslow published his now well-known Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
in a 1943 paper title “A Theory of Human Motivation.” Maslow identified five basic 
needs in which people are motivated to satisfy in mostly a progressive order (Maslow, 
1943):  
 Physiological: the needs of the human organism, which include breathing, 
nutriment, procreation, and homeostasis; 
 Safety: security of self, health, environment, and resources; 
 Love: friendship, family, and sexual intimacy; 
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 Esteem: self-esteem and respect by and of others;  
 Self-actualization: self-fulfillment in realizing one’s potential.  
 
The order of the needs is important in that the expectation is a person must satisfy 
the current need before focusing on a higher-level need – or at least that the most 
dominant need will monopolize the person’s consciousness (Maslow, 1943). These needs 
focus your goal setting.  
The hierarchy is commonly represented as a pyramid with each need as a layer of 
the pyramid representing the respective order of progression through the need hierarchy. 
In Maslow’s model most – if not all – of a layer’s needs must be meet before moving to a 







Figure 1: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
Challenges and Limitations of the Traditional View 
The hierarchy is presented as a fixed order progression model, but Maslow 
admitted that there were numerous exceptions. This limits what a person might focus on 
that the lower level are internal focused on the well-being of oneself without the 
influence of social relationships and families. It ignores cultures that might put the well-
being of the whole above the individual as a motivation that direct one’s actions that 
seem counter-intuitive to the self. In his publication, he discusses the influence of the 
parent’s state onto the child, but he ignores the changing dynamic of the relationship and 
influence that the child has on the parent.  
A CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
A more recent model was suggested by Dr. Steven Reiss, a retired tenured 
Professor of Psychology. In his book “Who Am I”, Dr. Steven Reiss outlines “the 16 
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basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personalities” that provide a 
framework for creating motivation profiles with relative values for each of the core 
human needs (Reiss, Ph.D., 2002). Dr Reiss considered a basic desire the subjective 
experience of a need (Steven Reiss, 2010). He called it the Reiss Profile, and it identifies 
the fundamental values, goals, and motives of human personality. Dr. Reiss identified the 
following 16 desires (human needs):  
 Acceptance, the need for approval 
 Curiosity, the need for learning and education 
 Eating, the need for food consumption 
 Family, the need to raise children 
 Honor, the need for traditional values of one’s group 
 Idealism, the need for social justice 
 Independence, the need for individuality 
 Order, the need for organization  
 Physical Activity, the need for exercise 
 Power, the need for influence 
 Romance, the need for sex 
 Saving, the need for collecting 
 Social Contact, the need for relationships 
 Social Status, the need for social significance 
 Tranquility, the need for safety 
 Vengeance, the need to win 
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Strength of the Contemporary View  
To best motivate an individual with intrinsic motivation, it is important to 
understand their internal belief and value system, specifically in regard to the behavior 
you want them to exhibit. It’s this diversity of individuals and cultures that causes 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs to fall short. The Reiss Profile enables non-sequential and 
non-hierarchy needs to be met per individual without dependencies on each other, which 
allows focusing effort and energy on specific needs to get a desired behavior without 
satisfying all the needs in a chain. Most importantly, the model allows the needs of 
another person (i.e. a child) to outweigh the needs of an individual. This is important 
because the direct receiver of benefits of the care is the child, whether in utero or as an 
individual, and not the mother or responsible party that needs to be directly motivated to 




Chapter 4: Analysis & Recommendations 
The intent of this paper is to apply motivational and economic incentive theories 
to the Medicaid population to address their barriers of care. Specifically, it will examine 
how extrinsic and intrinsic motivators affect behaviors to improve the quality of care. 
This chapter addresses the application of motivation to the primary parties in the medical 
delivery system: insurers, providers, and members.   
 
INSURER MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVES 
State Medicaid programs have the option to move the members into managed care 
organizations rather than have the State manage the population through a fee-for-service 
program, a program that reimburses individual providers for each service performed. The 
State can move the members into a risk-based managed care organization (MCO) or into 
a Primary Care Case Management (PCCM) program, the latter is a blend of fee-for-
service and conventional managed care. The two programs are similar in that they both 
utilize a capitation payment schedule – a fixed monthly fee – to provide care for the 
member (Kaiser Commission, 2010). In 2008, 33.4 million members, or 71% of all 
members, were enrolled into a managed care program (Kaiser Commission, 2010). 
States contract out their fee-for-service and PCCM programs to the private sector. 
Their available funds come from the State budget with Federal matching dollars. While 
the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 maintained the requirement for quality review 
of Medicaid MCOs, the State has no comparable standards or monitoring procedures 
required for the fee-for-service or PCCM programs (Kaiser Commission, 2010). The 
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vendors managing those programs as third-party administrators are motivated by 
operational excellence to increase profits from the contracted rate of the agreement and 
not by quality of care outcomes. In Texas, it took a lawsuit, Frew v. Hawkins originally 
filed in 1993, and subsequent corrective action orders, filed as late as 2007, to finally 
impact the culture around quality of care for well-child visits (Texas Health and Human 
Services Commission).  
The greatest challenge facing State Medicaid programs are the growing eligible 
population, the increasing medical costs, and the shrinking State budgets. To receive 
matching funds from the Federal government, States must implement a minimum set of 
benefits and coverage for its members. This compression of available funds to cover the 
minimum required benefits does not provide a lot of room to focus on quality of care 
issues, which are not federally mandated.  
The best use of financial incentives as an extrinsic motivator for State Medicaid 
programs is to use the federal matching funds. States could receive higher matching 
amounts based on their quality of care outcomes and compliance rates similar to how 
States are mandated to hold MCOs accountable. States could compete by fiscal year in a 
relative ranking formula for additional funds. This approach could have negative 
consequences if it was used to penalize States below the current levels, and it does not 
address the problem of States at the bottom never having the appropriate resources to 
implement better programs. It would need to be designed to carefully prevent States from 
remaining at the bottom without appropriate resources while encouraging them to re-
enforce their Medicaid programs in hopes of receiving more funding.  
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Managed care organizations are private health care insurers that operate either as 
a non-profit or for profit entity within the same State. Non-profit organizations still strive 
to make an operational profit, but that additional money is not distributed to the 
shareholders as dividends. These MCOs assume some or all risk for services for a 
monthly payment per member, a capitation rate. In 2008, 56 percent of participating 
insurers were Medicaid line of business primary, meaning that 75 percent or more of their 
business was through the Medicaid membership (Kaiser Commission, 2010). The other 
44 percent were primarily commercial plans with Medicaid as a secondary line of 
business.  
The financial incentive to assume the risk for the members is the small available 
window of profit between the administrative overhead of running operations and the 
medical loss ratio (MLR) – the amount of money spent on medical expenses. Eleven 
states have set a minimum level for the MLR to ensure that health plans spend at least 
that percentage on medical costs with Virginia and Hawaii at the top at 92 percent and 
91.5 percent, respectively (The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010).  
The following table discusses the findings from a report published by The 
Commonwealth Fund about Medicaid managed care plans’ costs and quality of care 
provided to the patients. It looks at Medicaid-only (primary line of business plans) and 
multi-product plans across both public and private companies.  The final two columns in 
the table compare a special class of health plan, provider-sponsored, which “include plans 
that are owned, affiliated, or governed by health care systems, community health centers 
and clinics, or physician practices.” (McCue & Bailit, 2011)  
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Operating Cash Flow (OCF) uses the Per Member Per Month (PMPM) 
measurement as a way to normalize data sets across different health plans by creating a 
ratio for the data across one member enrolled for one month consecutively. This ratio 
allows for comparing data between plans even when membership sizes differ. It 
represents the amount of cash a company generates from the revenues it collect, in case 
revenues represents the capitation payments from the Medicaid sponsor (State Medicaid 
























Financial Performance        
Medical Loss Ratio 84% 90% 88% 90% 89% 71% 
Administrative Cost Ratio 14% 10% 12% 10% 8% 12% 
Operating Cash Flow (PMPM) $4.55 $4.11 $5.40 $4.11 $3.04 $5.26 
Clinical Quality Measures       
Preventive Care Composite 59% 70% 62% 70% 71% 63% 
Chronic Illness Care Composite 50% 63% 52% 63% 64% 56% 
Consumer Experience       
Overall Rating of Plan 66% 73% 72% 73% 77% 71% 
Getting Care Composite 75% 79% 76% 79% 79% 77% 
Customer Service Composite 80% 83% 81% 83% 82% 81% 
Table 4: Assessment of Medicaid-Focused Health Plans from 2009 and 2012 (McCue & Bailit, 2011)
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Private Medicaid companies spend more money on patient care (MLR) and have 
lower administrative costs versus their public counterparts. In addition, their composite 
scores for both the quality measures and consumer experience are higher than the public 
companies. Provider-sponsored organizations had significantly lower administrative 
costs, higher expenditures on medical care, and better quality of care and customer 
service than the non-provider sponsored organizations.  
Intrinsic motivation for insurers is driven from the core mission of that company 
and how they relate to corporate social responsibility – how the activities of the 
organization affect the community and the consumers as stakeholders. Those health plans 
with more roots to the local community, the provider-sponsored health plans, had better 
quality of care and customer service results, and spent 97% of their premiums.  
Pay for Performance (P4P) is being tried as an extrinsic motivator for Medicaid 
MCOs. Pennsylvania has established a pay for performance program from 2005 and have 
distributed approximately $9 million just in the first two years of the program 
(Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 2007). They realized improvements in six 
of the twelve HEDIS measures related to quality of care and access to care.  
Pay for Performance programs allocate funds at a high-level with the insurer and 
expect that insurer to address needs and provide services to support better health 
outcomes. They do not specify the implementation rules or how an MCO might address 
some of the common barriers in that they do not specifically incentivize the MCO to 
maintain rural provider networks and improve transportation services. The funds may not 
trickle down the actual care giver (provider) or member and so might not address 
motivational drivers for those participants, but insurers have larger financial resources to 
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be able to develop programs to help manage care and act as natural data aggregators of 
their provider network.  
Recommendation  
Since the insurer is less connected with the member and provider relationship, 
extrinsic rewards for improvement might be better allocated at that level of relationship. 
To address shortcomings in the reimbursement rates with providers, and the impact to 
provider participating in the program and provider network, States could use additional 
payments to support raising rates associated with preventive services that they want to 
target.  
Like other businesses, health plans are driven by the needs of their shareholders 
and can define their operating model as one (or more) of the “Value Disciplines” to 
create customer value and provide a competitive advantage (Treacy & Wiersema, 1993). 
The Value Disciplines are: Product Leadership, Operational Excellence, and Customer 
Intimacy. Product Leadership strives to product market leading products. Medicaid health 
plans are limited to disciplines as the benefits and coverage is mandated by law and the 
premiums and capitations for those benefits are considerably less. A health plan would 
need to be intrinsically motivated to spend money and expand the benefits and programs 
offered to membership or faced with sanctions for failing to meet the minimum quality of 
care.  
This forces these insurers and providers into Operational Excellence to focus on 
minimizing administrative costs and controlling medical costs for maximizing the return. 
Quality should not be about how many people you rendered services to but how well 
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those services were rendered. Customer Intimacy focuses on excelling in customer 
service and relationships. The insurers that were provider sponsored, and intrinsically 
motivated by their core mission, exhibited a greater relationship with their community 
that resulted in higher compliance rates and plan satisfaction.  
The Medicaid program needs to encourage States to utilize private community-
owned or provider sponsored health insurers. Their core values and integral connection 
with their community makes a built-in intrinsic motivator for the organization. These 
private companies scored better overall in financial performance, clinical quality 
measures, and consumer experience.  
PROVIDER MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVES 
Access to providers are one of the most consistently named barriers to care for the 
Medicaid population, and 16.3 percent of Medicaid members had at least 1 barrier to 
timely primary care, which is twice the amount of private insurance (Cheung, Wiler, 
Lowe, & Ginde, 2012). For access to care, especially in rural areas, low provider 
participation in Medicaid program limits availability. Even for those providers that do 
participate, their panels – the membership they have responsibility for primary care – are 
mixed between private insurance and Medicaid, which creates an artificial competition 
for resources based on provider reimbursements.  
Colorado found in 2007 that the Medicaid fee schedule had an EPSDT visit for 
under 1 years of age to pay out $55.05 to the provider while the average commercial rate 
was $124.00 (Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, 2007). When 
surveyed, 90.8 percent of providers in South Dakota stated that “Medicaid does not pay 
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enough to cover their overhead costs,” which means the provider cost shift those 
additional costs to their private insurances (South Dakota State Medical Association, 
2009). The survey also found that 30.3 percent of the same providers have stopped 
accepting new Medicaid patients and 2.5 percent have stopped accepting all Medicaid 
patients due to reimbursement levels. While reimbursement rates have increased 15.1 
percent on average, this increased rate was below the general rate of inflation for the 
same time period of 2003-2008 and resulted in a reduction in real payments (Zuckerman, 
Stockley, & Williams, 2009). In general, Medicaid pays 20-25 percent less than private 
insurance (Smith, 2009).  
In addition to the reimbursement rate difference between Medicaid and private 
insurance, providers cannot charge Medicaid recipients money for not showing up to an 
appointment, which is an option for private insurance. This is a lost opportunity for 
revenue and can have an overbooking affect for providers, which is one of the complaints 
in barriers to care – long wait room times. On a side note, there was a research paper that 
evaluated the best method to optimize overbooking similar to how airlines perform to 
decrease no-show problems from their initial finding “that patient no-show rates always 
increase after overbooking.” (Zeng, Zhao, & Lawley) 
Administratively, turnaround times on claims processing and receiving the actual 
reimbursement – the time after the provider has spent resources to deliver a service and 
when an insurer reimburses for that expenditure – has a direct effect on provider 
participating that raising reimbursement rates might not be able to offset. Commercial 
reimbursement times are faster that Medicaid times in every state (Cunningham & 
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O'Malley, 2008). This highlights another disparity between Medicaid programs and 
private insurance that discourages providers from participating.  
The disparity between the rates, processes and procedures and how providers 
react can be evaluated by using the equity theory, first developed by John Stacey Adams 
in 1963 (Adam's Equity Theory). Equity theory seeks to explain relational satisfaction 
and perceived fairness between the inputs a worker provides (health care providers 
delivering services) and the outputs they receive (reimbursement for services rendered). 
Given an imbalance between the inputs and outputs, inputs will be adjusted to have a 
perceived balance with outputs. Applying this to providers that have fixed outputs – the 
reimbursement rate is fixed – providers will seek a balance by lowering their inputs. This 
is further amplified by social comparison when the output of the Medicaid reimbursement 
rates are compared with the reimbursement rates from private insurance. Reimbursement 
turnaround is a controllable output for insurers. While a simple model overall, equity 
theory applies well in this case where the outputs are fixed and the evaluation is to the 
reaction and how to balance the inputs.  
While revenues compose the base economic incentives for providers, insurers are 
implementing pay for performance programs that supplement the standard fee schedules 
with additional money for performing specific services or improving quality of care rates. 
Pay for performance is an incentive program, for health care providers, which rewards 
providers for meeting targets for quality of care goals. The rewards include financial 
payment models and non-financial models (LLanos, MBA, Rothstein, MPP, MPH, Dyer, 
& Bailit, 2007). Studies measuring the impact of pay for performance programs are just 
emerging for both managed care organizations (MCOs) and health care providers, and 
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results related to prenatal and well-child care specifically will be extrapolated from 
studies and research regarding general preventive care and applied to the barriers to care 
identified. 
In 2006, 28 states had existing programs and 34 states were implementing new 
programs with a projection of 85 percent of states having a pay for performance program 
by 2011 (Kuhmerker, 2007). These pay for performance programs are financial 
incentives using extrinsic motivation to encourage the provider organizations improve 
quality of care, but they focus on the provider organization and not the direct care giver 
physician. A few non-financial incentives were identified and recommended, but these 
were more indirect financial incentives because they led to better brand recognition (e.g. 
a distinguished provider rating), lower administration costs (e.g. technical assistance and 
reduced administrative requirements), and market share (e.g. auto-assignment 
preferences) that would raise revenue or profits (LLanos, MBA, Rothstein, MPP, MPH, 
Dyer, & Bailit, 2007).  
As an extrinsic motivator, pay for performance programs are at risk for abuse (e.g. 
“gaming”), lowering performance, and diminishing intrinsic motivation. These programs 
are focused on provider organizations and require the organization to trickle down policy 
and cultural changes to implement an effective quality improvement program. They 
measure meeting a number, usually a HEDIS measurement criteria, that tries to quantify 
quality of care but does not actually consider the satisfaction and outcome of the care 
other than the service was received. These programs could have unintended effects on 
true care and an organization’s culture. They could encourage providers to focus on just 
the few quality measures and ignore other important aspects of care (RAND 
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Corporation). Community-owned health clinics with strong ties to the community and 
mission to serve their community would be at risk for lowered intrinsic motivation 
because of the financial incentives that could redefine their culture.  
Recent evaluations of pay for performance programs is lacking, but some studies 
are starting to show mixed results and question if these programs can improve patient 
outcomes and cut costs (RAND Corporation).  
Recommendation  
The type of provider organization and size of the organization might decide the 
approach to incentives and motivation. A larger organization might do better with an 
extrinsic economic motivator that it can internalize and distribute according to its overall 
policies. Also, a larger organization can better manage the service reimbursement rate 
disparately between commercial and Medicaid patients by having more commercial 
patients to spread the additional costs of the Medicaid ones.  
A smaller group or private physician is more sensitive to panel size (the number 
of members assigned to them or patients that are customers) and composition, Medicaid 
versus commercial. They may see participating in the program as their charity because of 
the missed opportunity for a higher margin in reimbursement rates when a Medicaid 
patient replaces a commercial one.  
For both large and small, the reimbursement rate issue becomes a negative 
extrinsic motivator for providers because of the disparity. Adding a pay for performance 
program only works if it can close the gap between the rates, and it is easily achievable 
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and quickly given. This makes it more of a supplemental compensation rather than an 
incremental reward for achieving specific outcomes.  
The advantage of the insurer is that they have more resources available than a 
provider to perform outreach to the members, but the disadvantage is they often have less 
of a relationship with the member than the provider. This relationship and the provider’s 
ties with their local community can be reinforced to provide better care, and it grants an 
opportunity for using intrinsic motivators with the provider. States need to close the rate 
gap to give more resources to the providers to support the provider and member 
relationship. This is highly visible between the compliance rates between the commercial 
members and the Medicaid members, and as it impacts provider participation in the 
program, it becomes on the first major barriers to care.  
With provider participating being a large barrier to access to care, the States 
should seek to close the rate reimbursement gap between the Medicaid Program and 
commercial programs to remove the negative extrinsic incentive for providers. Both the 
State and health plans need to find better ways to support with resources and utilize the 
provider-patient relationship. 
MEMBER MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVES 
Florida and Idaho used extrinsic motivation to reward Medicaid members for 
healthy behaviors as early as 2006 and 2007, respectively (Center for Health Care 
Strategies, Inc., 2007). The rewards were credits for other services, like over-the-counter 
medications. They found that even with the program, a lot of members did not know 
about the incentive program, or they were unsure how to spend the credits they did earn 
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often confusing them with a bill for services (Alker & Hoadley, 2008). As of 2011, Idaho 
still did not have data to show whether the incentives had an impact on behavior or 
proved to be cost-effective, and Florida had logistic issues with their program 
implementation and have not recognized if the incentives have had an impact on their 
Medicaid population (Miles, 2011).  
Research to date on the effectiveness of incentivizing healthy behaviors has been 
very limited. Since the programs are modeled after the private sectors, the demographics 
of the recipients differ, and the programs need to be adjusted to meet those differences 
and their unique barriers to care. For example, transportation was noted as one the top 
barriers to care. Incentivize receiving a preventive service may not adequately address 
how the member actually gets to the physician’s office.  
Another emerging incentive program is pay for prevention, or client incentives, in 
which the recipient is the member themselves. The program is designed to incentivize 
healthy behaviors like receiving well-child visits (Greene, PhD, 2007). Research and 
studies on extrinsic incentives to members are limited. 
Using the contemporary model of intrinsic motivation, motivators can be 
identified to reinforce the family relationships in members. Direct and indirect needs may 
have a positive or negative impact to motivation and the individual’s relationship to 
family. For example, honor as a need might have a negative impact from culture and how 
one’s culture perceives the importance of care or the source of a chronic disease. To 
improve the quality of care, nutrition and diet concerns must be culturally sensitive (need 
for honor) while considering how the diet impacts the fetus and infant (quality of care) 
(Central Virginia Health Planning Agency, Inc., 2010). Needs can be used as leverage to 
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force behaviors, such as making receiving care “achievements” that drive social status. 
This would be similar to how the social networking video game industry uses behavioral 
psychology to reinforce addictive behaviors through achievements and sharing. 
Although, not always with successful results (Antin & Churchill, 2011). 
Recommendation  
At this level of participation, individuals are making decisions on the value of 
preventive care and how hard they will try to overcome any barriers to care. Using 
intrinsic motivators provides the best reinforcement for behaviors because it can avoid 
the negative impacts of financial incentives. In the case of mothers and preventive care 
services, it is the safety and care of their child (unborn or infant) which is an indirect need 
for the mother. Even for those parents motivated to provide preventive services to their 
children, they still must overcome the barriers to care that include access to care and 
transportation, communication barriers, and simply awareness of services and education.  
The strength of the motivation is directly in conflict with the challenge of 
overcoming the barrier, and while challenge of the barrier can be reduce, they may not 
always be removed. States have the opportunity during eligibility verification and the 
enrollment into the program process to learn more about the member’s individual needs 
to improve the effectiveness of outreach programs. States should gather more information 
to tailor outreach programs, safety and support programs to people – recognizing them as 
individuals. This can be done with surveys and screenings during the enrollment process 
to capture information about that individuals barriers to care and value system. For 
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example, the State could create a Reiss Profile on each member that would then be 





Chapter 5: Conclusions 
The health care delivery system is a complicated system to navigate with all the 
players, insurers, provider, and consumers, moving their own direction with their own 
motives. A significant amount of financial resources are allocate to Medicaid programs to 
provide health care to pregnant mothers and children of low income families. Yet, their 
compliance with preventive services is much lower than their private insurance 
counterparts. Medicaid members experience barriers to care that private insurance 
members do not at the same levels.  
But the focus has not been on encourage or reinforcing intrinsic motivation, it has 
been on financial incentives to reinforce extrinsic motivation through pay for 
performance programs for insurers and providers with slower adoption with member pay 
for performance programs. Pay for performance programs have the following risks:  
 
 Risk of “gaming” the system that introduces unethical – and potentially 
illegal – behavior. This could be represented as adverse selection for 
accepting new patients in which patients with high risk factors of non-
compliance are excluded from the provider practice, or more simply just 
misrepresentation of the data and calculations (e.g. filing false claims for 
services).  
 They can create pay inequity amongst peers that can harm overall 
performance. The money might go consistently to a top performing 
provider that has a more healthy population instead of supporting the 
provider that requires additional resources to bring patients into 
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compliance. This could be exhibited through the social comparison and 
the equity theory.  
 Offering extrinsic rewards to members to be compliance with preventive 
care might actually crowd-out the intrinsic motivation.   
 
Focusing on extrinsic motivators and financial rewards in health care to improve 
quality of care and increase compliance with preventive services has not proved to be 
overwhelming successful to date. Incentive programs might work better if they focus on 
how to strength intrinsic motivation for organizations to have community ties. For 
individuals, intrinsic motivation would have a more lasting effect on the members and be 
more effective overall if you could identify a way to apply it to a large scale.  
In conclusion, States should recognize the value of organizations with 
communities and how that affects the organization’s values and intrinsic motivation. 
They should seek to further encourage the formation and support of these types of 
organizations with legislation. With provider participating being a large barrier to access 
to care, the States should seek to close the rate reimbursement gap between the Medicaid 
Program and commercial programs to remove the negative extrinsic incentive for 
providers. Finally, States should take advantage of the opportunity during the enrollment 
process into the Medicaid Program for members to perform an intrinsic motivational 
profile along with social and economic indicators. They should focus funds on removing 
the barriers to care and encouraging members to receive preventive services not through 
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